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Economic growth in Vietnam has been fairly resilient to the global commodity and 
financial crises, but it is unclear why. In addition, the impact of the crises on 
employment and poverty is in dispute. We develop a dynamic computable general 
equilibrium model to decompose impacts and estimate distributional outcomes. Our 
results indicate that the 2008 commodity crisis increased employment and reduced 
poverty by favouring labour-intensive exports, especially in agriculture. The 2009 
financial crisis reversed these gains. It pushed more than a million workers into 
unemployment and about 3 million people below the US$2-a-day poverty line, with the 
vast majority of these being rural dwellers. The net effect of the crises left Vietnam … 
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little changed from a baseline (no crises) path in terms of aggregate indicators including 
the poverty rate. An effective stimulus package has the potential to offset one third of 
the increase in poverty caused by the financial crisis leaving poverty rates below the (no 
crises) baseline. 
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1 Introduction 
Vietnam’s economy has grown rapidly over the last two decades, and poverty has declined 
without a significant deterioration in inequality (Glewwe et al. 2002; GSO 2007). Agriculture 
played a key role in this process. Large parts of the sector were transformed from subsistence 
to export-orientation and Vietnam became a major exporter of grains and other foods. During 
the 2008 commodity crisis, world prices for Vietnam’s major exports rose rapidly, but 
during the 2009 financial crisis and subsequent global recession there was a sharp decline in 
world prices, demand for exports, and foreign investment. Economic growth in Vietnam 
slowed in early 2009, but the economy continued to expand and there were clear signs of 
recovery during the second half of the year. This suggests that, from a macroeconomic 
perspective, Vietnam has so far weathered the two crises fairly well.  
 
It is uncertain, however, what the effect of the crises has been on workers and households and 
what the lasting welfare implications will be. Industrial workers were laid off in early 2009, 
possibly resulting in migration back to rural areas (Van 2009), but it is unclear to what extent 
agriculture and the rural non-farm economy cushioned the incomes of displaced workers and 
their households. Moreover, Vietnam’s government responded to the financial crisis by 
introducing a stimulus package aimed at stabilizing capital markets, encouraging domestic 
investment and extending social security. The extent to which these measures might offset 
growth and welfare losses is the subject of debate. 
 
Given the uncertainty surrounding household-level outcomes, we estimate the impact of the 
commodity and financial crises on growth, employment, and poverty. We also assess the 
government’s stimulus package. Section 2 describes Vietnam’s economy and its growth 
performance during the crises. Section 3 considers the impact channels through which 
economic growth may have been affected. To translate macro-level impacts into household 
incomes and poverty we develop a dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) model 
described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the simulations and results, and the final section 
concludes.  
2 Vietnam’s  economic  performance during the crises 
2.1  Structure of the Vietnamese economy  
Total gross domestic product (GDP) was US$61.3 billion in 2007, equivalent to US$743 per 
capita for Vietnam’s 82.5 million people.1 Industry generates two-fifths of total GDP and 
one-fifth of employment, two-thirds of which is in manufacturing (Table 1). Industrial goods 
also generate a major share of Vietnam’s export earnings due to large contributions from 
textile and clothing (25.8 per cent), agro-processing (12.5 per cent), and metals and 
machinery (11.9 per cent). Oil has also contributed significantly (19.0 per cent). Vietnam is 
equally dependent on industrial imports, particularly metals and machinery (38.5 per cent), 
fuel and chemicals (22.5 per cent), and textiles (15.3 per cent).    
                                                 
1 Adjusting for purchasing power, per capita GDP in 2006 was US$2,363 (World Bank 2009a).    2
Table 1: Structure of the Vietnamese economy, 2007 
  Share of total (%)  Export 
intensity 
Import 
intensity   GDP  Employment  Exports  Imports 
Total GDP  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  32.4  39.1 
         
Agriculture 22.1  53.9  7.6  2.0  21.3  8.4 
   Crops  13.4  36.6  4.6  1.4  23.3  10.3 
   Livestock  2.7  8.5  0.4  0.0  7.4  1.6 
   Forestry/fishing  5.9  8.8  2.6  0.6  23.4  8.2 
         
Industry  41.7 19.9  76.1 85.4 38.5 48.7 
   Mining  10.9  0.9  19.0  0.6  82.9  14.9 
   Manufacturing  20.1  13.3  57.1  84.9  40.7  57.8 
      Agro-processing  5.8  4.1  12.5  4.3  33.5  20.3 
      Textiles/clothing  3.7  2.2  25.8  15.3  68.6  62.2 
      Wood/paper  1.4  0.8  2.9  3.0  34.9  44.2 
      Fuel/chemicals  2.8  2.3  3.2  22.5  21.8  74.7 
      Metals/machinery  4.4  3.0  11.9  38.5  36.8  70.4 
      Other  2.8  1.4  1.4  2.7  8.1  17.6 
   Other  10.7  5.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
         
Services  36.2 26.1  16.3 12.6 22.0 20.5 
Note: GDP is gross domestic product; ‘export intensity’ is the share of exports in gross domestic output; ‘import 
intensity’ is the share of imports in total demand.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the 2007 social accounting matrix (Arndt et al. 2009). 
 
Agriculture is another key sector, generating one-fifth of total GDP and employing half the 
country’s workforce. Crops dominate, with paddy rice alone accounting for 6.8 per cent of 
total GDP. Seafood and traditional crops, such as rubber and coffee, have strong downstream 
linkages to manufacturing, where raw agricultural products are processed and often exported. 
Agriculture in Vietnam is more export-oriented than in most developing countries, with 
agriculture and agro-processing together generating one-fifth of all export earnings. 
Moreover, 10 per cent of agricultural investment is FDI (GSO 2009a). Agriculture in 
Vietnam thus has relatively strong ties to global market conditions. 
 
Agriculture’s importance extends beyond its contribution to GDP, employment and export 
earnings. Three quarters of Vietnam’s population live in rural areas, where most derive some 
farm income. Poverty is also much higher in rural areas. According to the 2006 Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS), 47 per cent of Vietnam’s population lives 
below the US$2-a-day poverty line (GSO 2007). Yet equivalent rural and urban poverty rates 
are 59 per cent and 15 per cent respectively, implying that about 90 per cent of the poor 
population is in rural areas. Moreover, poorer urban households spend half of their incomes 
on food. Agriculture therefore plays a crucial role in households’ livelihoods, especially for 
the poor. 
2.2  Economic growth during the crises 
Vietnam’s real economy expanded at an average 7.5 per cent per year during 2000-07 
(Figure 1). Growth in total GDP decelerated slightly during the 2008 commodity crisis driven   3
by a small slowdown in services and a larger decline in industry. Falling industrial growth 
was due to construction, whose annualized growth rate dropped from 12 per cent to 0 per 
cent. Agricultural growth, by contrast, rose from 3 per cent to 4 per cent due to expanded 
crop and aquaculture production (GSO 2009b). Vietnam’s overall performance during the 
2008 commodity crisis was thus characterized by stronger agricultural growth and continued 
industrial growth outside of construction.  
Figure 1: Annualized economic growth by major sectors, 2000-09 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using General Statistical Office (GSO 2009a, 2009b). 
 
Economic growth slowed sharply in the first quarter of 2009, which marks the height of the 
financial crisis and the onset of the global recession. Industry’s deceleration was almost 
exclusively due to manufacturing, with firms temporarily closing factories and dismissing 
workers (Van 2009). The financial crisis also marked a reversal for agriculture. Crop 
production growth slowed from 5.7 per cent during the first half of 2008 to 0.7 per cent in 
2009 (GSO 2009b). The decline was even more pronounced for aquaculture, whose 
annualized growth rate fell from 30 per cent to 2 per cent. Although rice and seafood were 
affected by lower export demand, at least some of their poor performance in early 2009 was 
due to adverse weather conditions. The slight slowdown in services resulted from weakened 
foreign tourism.2 Ultimately, only transport and construction grew robustly during the 2009 
financial crisis with all other sectors either stagnating or contracting. However, during the 
second half of 2009 agriculture and industry have shown signs of recovery, suggesting that 
the negative growth effects of the financial crisis may be fairly short-lived.   
3  Growth and poverty impact channels 
This section examines the apparent resilience of national GDP growth to the two crises, 
considering various impact channels, including the financial sector; foreign direct investment; 
world prices and trade; and the government’s stimulus package. We also identify various 
channels linking the macro-level impacts of the crises to household incomes and poverty.  
                                                 

















































































































3.1  Financial sector and monetary policy 
Vietnam’s financial sector has been fairly insulated from the financial crisis. Andersen et al. 
(2008) identify three sources of potential financial instability in developing countries 
resulting from the financial crisis: (i) exposure to illiquid/downgraded assets in developed 
countries; (ii) presence of foreign-owned domestic banks; and (iii) liquidity constraints from 
a shortage of short-term capital in international money markets. None of these have been 
present in Vietnam.  
 
First, the country has limited direct exposure to the ‘toxic assets’ that undermined many 
Western financial institutions. Vietnam’s banks are generally well capitalized with limited 
reliance on credit lines to Western banks (i.e., low balance sheet exposure). Nevertheless, 
asset prices, and in particular stocks, are highly sensitive to market sentiment and the external 
environment. The stock-market therefore plummeted in late 2008 and early 2009.  
 
Second, despite the rising market shares of joint-stock commercial banks, most banking 
assets remain on the balance sheets of five state-owned banks. This limited exposure to 
troubled foreign-owned banks and provided the government with a mechanism for 
controlling credit rates, which proved to be a key instrument in its stimulus package. The 
state-supported Vietnam Bank for Social Policy (VBSP) also provided a means of efficiently 
disbursing government-subsidized loans to rural communities.  
 
Finally, the tightening of monetary policy in mid 2008 to cool the economy was reversed in 
late 2008 due to the financial crisis. Monetary policy remained loose, with government 
interest rate subsidies expanding credit and money supply during 2009. Overall, total 
liquidity (measured by M2) rose by 35 per cent in the first half of 2009. The supply of short-
term capital was therefore expanded and the impact of the crisis on the financial sector has 
remained small.  
3.2  Foreign direct investment  
One motivation for tightening monetary policy in 2008 was the high levels of inflation caused 
in part by large surges in FDI (Figure 2). The financial crisis caused a sharp contraction in 
global capital markets in late 2008, including foreign capital inflows to Vietnam. By early 
2009, FDI had fallen below 2007 levels. This slowdown in investment helped stabilize 
consumer prices, with inflation returning to pre-2007 trends. Thus, a positive outcome of the 
financial crisis was that it cooled the overheating Vietnamese economy. 
 
To isolate the effects of the financial crisis on FDI, we compare flows in late 2008 with those 
in late 2007, treating the spike in FDI in 2008 as independent of the two crises. This 
comparison suggests that almost all of the reduction in FDI caused by the financial crisis 
occurred in the industrial sectors, with manufacturing being the worst affected (GSO 2009b). 
FDI in agriculture and downstream agro-processing also declined, although these were 
among the least affected sectors. By contrast, FDI in the transport sector rose during the 
crisis, possibly explaining its continued growth while other sectors declined (Section 2). 
Using 2007 trends as a baseline and excluding the transport sector, FDI inflows to Vietnam 
were more than 20 per cent below what they would have been had the financial crisis not 
occurred. The decline in FDI has implications for growth in both contemporaneous and future 
periods. 
   5
Figure 2: Foreign investment, consumer prices and exchange rate, 2000-09 
 
Note: Foreign direct investment is implemented and not registered investment.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using General Statistical Office (GSO 2009a, 2009b). 
 
3.3  World commodity prices and foreign trade 
World commodity prices rose rapidly in late 2007 and peaked in mid 2008 (Figure 3). Food 
and energy prices rose especially fast, with the largest increases recorded for rice and crude 
oil. Both of these commodities are major exports for Vietnam, generating a quarter of export 
earnings. Smaller price increases were recorded for major imports, such as metals and 
machinery. Overall, the 2008 commodity crisis improved Vietnam’s terms of trade. However, 
rising prices generated worldwide concern for food security, and prompted Vietnam to ban 
incremental rice exports during the first half of 2008. In other words, planned exports were 
permitted to continue (and to reap the terms of trade gain). However, agents were prevented 
from increasing export levels thus preventing reallocation of domestic supplies to exports in 
response to higher world prices.  
 
The financial crisis and subsequent global recession caused world prices to fall rapidly to 
levels similar to those of 2007. Crude oil prices initially declined below 2007 levels, thus 
having a detrimental effect on Vietnam’s terms of trade, but prices had returned to 2007 
levels by late 2009. Moreover, food prices remained similar to or even above 2007 levels 
throughout the financial crisis. By contrast, metals and minerals prices fell below 2007 levels 
and their rebound by late 2009 remained fairly modest. This suggests that Vietnam’s import 
prices may have fallen by more than export prices during the financial crisis. It also 
underlines the divergent effects of the commodity and financial crises. 
 
Changes in world prices reflect shifts in global demand. Vietnam is a very open economy 
and, as such, is vulnerable to falling export demand. Merchandise exports fell during the first 
quarter of 2009 relative to the quarterly average for 2008 (see Table 2). Most of this decline 
was driven by agriculture, food and textiles, where exports fell by about 40 per cent. Crude 
oil exports remained relatively stable, albeit below peak 2008 values. Moreover, some export 























































































































































value of most export products declined during the financial crisis, by mid 2009 they had 
again surpassed 2007 levels. This may reflect price-inelastic demand for many of Vietnam’s 
exported products, such as grains and low-value clothing.  
Figure 3: World commodity prices, 2006-09 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using World Bank (2009b). 
 
Table 2: Foreign merchandise trade, 2006-09  
  Quarterly average value (constant 2007 US$ million) 






Trade balance   -789  -3,082 -1,357 4,341 -408 -897 
   Imports  10,943  15,191 18,472 10,643 16,104 16,648 
   Exports  10,155  12,110 17,116 14,984 15,696 15,751 
    Agric/food  2,134  2,121 2,843 1,585 2,093 1,627 
    Crude oil  2,575  3,153 4,041 3,358 3,991 4,178 
    Textiles/clothing  2,080 2,468 3,499 2,220 4,122 3,262 
    Other  3,366  4,367 6,732 7,820 5,491 6,685 
Source: Authors’ calculations using General Statistical Office (GSO 2009a, 2009b). 
 
There were also substantial declines in import demand, which almost halved during the first 
quarter of 2009. This was driven by falling FDI, which is highly import-intensive and 
accounted for about 40 per cent of merchandise imports in 2008 (GSO 2009a). Lower 
inflation and some depreciation of the nominal exchange rate also helped reduce import 
demand (Figure 2). Ultimately, imports declined by more than exports pushing the trade 
balance into surplus in the first three months of 2009. This raised national GDP and offset 
declining foreign investment. The strong links between FDI and imports reduces the risks 
typically associated with current account deficits. While the decline in FDI clearly translated 
into reduced investment and hence reduced future growth, it also eliminated the current 
account deficit thus obviating the frequently experienced need to restructure the economy to 
produce more tradables and fewer non-tradables when a principal source of foreign exchange 
declines. This automatic stabilization mechanism explains some of the resilience of 
























































































































3.4  Government stimulus package 
As in many countries, Vietnam’s government put in place a stimulus package in early 2009 to 
bolster investment and private consumption during the financial crisis. The International 
Monetary Fund estimated that Vietnam’s proposed stimulus package was worth US$4billion, 
although the official budget was US$8.6million (Table 3). A large component of the stimulus 
package was a 4 per cent interest rate subsidy, which is estimated to have generated 
US$24.1billion in additional lending. About 68 per cent of these subsidies went to private 
businesses and 17 per cent to households. The intended impact of the stimulus package was 
to offset some of the declines in foreign investment, and may explain the strong growth in 
construction from mid 2009 onwards. 
Table 3: Vietnam’s proposed stimulus package (January 2009) 
 US$  billion 
Total proposed cost  8.6 
   Interest support  1.0 
   Delayed payback for construction capital in 2009  0.2 
   Advanced capital investment (from 2009/10)  2.2 
   Transfer planned investment capital (2008-09)  1.8 
   Additional government bonds  1.2 
   Tax reduction   1.6 
   Other expenditures (including social safety)  0.6 
Source: Government of the National Assembly Report 77/CP-KTTH (5 May 2009). 
 
The largest component of the stimulus package is ‘advanced capital’, which brings forward 
planned investments from future budgets. The government announced that half of the funds 
would be devoted to transport infrastructure and the rest would be divided evenly between 
agriculture and small businesses. It is unclear how much of these funds were actually 
disbursed, but the government announced in late 2009 that it would implement a 
US$3.3billion stimulus package targeting agriculture and rural development. Most of these 
funds have been allocated to infrastructure, including irrigation, grain storage, and farm 
machinery. Finally, in its original stimulus package the government directly targeted 
households via tax relief and social transfers. 
3.5 Household  consumption   
To date, no firm quantitative evidence exists which can gauge the effects of the crises on 
private consumption. However, there are a range of impact channels that should be 
considered. The first channel is via domestic prices. The effect of world price changes 
depends on the degree of price transmission and the composition of households’ incomes and 
expenditures. Some empirical studies indicate that international to domestic price 
transmission is high in Vietnam (Rapsomanikis and Sarris 2007). This is potentially 
important for food products, which comprise 47 per cent and 33 per cent of rural and urban 
households’ consumption baskets respectively (Arndt et al. 2009). Food is also a larger 
consumption item for low-income consumers, implying that changes in world food prices 
could have significant implications for poverty. However, households, especially the poor in 
rural areas, often produce their own food. Indeed, home production accounts for about a third 
of total consumption in Vietnam. World price impacts will be substantially smaller for those 
households that produce a large share of their own consumer goods, and the degree of price 
transmission remains subject to debate (Abbott et al. 2009).  
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The second channel is via employment and wages. Although national GDP did not fall in 
2008-2009, there were larger adjustments at the firm-level. Vietnam’s government estimates 
that 80,000 jobs were lost in the early stages of the financial crisis and that the total job losses 
may be as high as 400,000 (cited in Van 2008). Many factories ceased production in early 
2009 causing unemployment rates to rise. Moreover, the government suggests that a million 
workers were ‘affected’ by the crisis, meaning that workers who retained their jobs earn 
lower wages. Thus, the impact of the crisis on employment and wages depends on shifts in 
firms’ profitability and labour demand.  
 
The final impact channel is taxes and transfers. Vietnamese households received US$3.5 
billion in foreign transfers in 2007. This was US$44 per capita or 7.3 per cent of total 
household income. Projections indicate that remittances fell by 8 per cent in 2009 (World 
Bank 2009c). This may not directly affect poverty, however, since higher-income households 
receive most remittances. For instance, transfers from abroad generated 15 per cent of 
incomes for households in the top income quintile in 2007, but less than 2 per cent of 
incomes for the bottom three quintiles (Arndt et al. 2009). Moreover, some households will 
benefit from new social transfers in the government’s stimulus package. Existing social 
transfers averaged US$27 per capita in 2007 and were biased towards urban households in 
the middle of the income distribution.  
 
In summary, this section has suggested why national GDP growth in Vietnam did not 
collapse during the two crises. The 2008 commodity crisis improved terms of trade, 
especially for agriculture, prior to policy intervention. Evidence also indicates that falling 
FDI during the 2009 financial crisis was associated with a dramatic decline in imports and 
was further offset by the government’s stimulus package. Throughout the crisis, the financial 
sector remained insulated from disruptions in developed countries’ financial systems. 
However, there is so far little quantitative evidence on the distributional impacts on private 
consumption or welfare effects on different population groups.  
4  Economy-wide modeling framework 
4.1  A core general equilibrium model  
Table 4 presents the equations of a simple DCGE model illustrating how changes in world 
prices and foreign capital inflows affect employment and household incomes. Producers of 
each commodity c produce a level of output Q by employing the factors of production F 
under constant returns to scale (exogenous productivity α) and fixed production technologies 
(fixed factor input shares δ) (eq. [1]). Profit maximization implies that factor payments W are 
equal to average production revenues (eq. [2]). Total labour, land, and capital supply s are 
fixed, implying full employment and intersector mobility (eq. [10]). This means that 
declining farm/factory production causes factor demand to fall, which in turn lowers 
economy-wide factor returns and affects production in other sectors.  
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Table 4: Core model equations  
Production function            · ∏      
   
         (1) 
Factor payments       ·      
 
       ·     ·    
 
  (2) 
Import supply               
         0  (3) 
Export demand           ·   
         0  (4) 
Household income               ·     ·     
  
     ·     (5) 
Consumption demand      ·            ·  1      ·     (6) 
Investment demand      ·          ·        ·    
 
     ·      (7) 
Current account balance    
  ·         
  ·           
 
     (8) 
Product market equilibrium                   
 
             (9) 
Factor market equilibrium              
 
  (10) 
Land and labour expansion             ·  1       f is land and 
labour 
(11) 
Capital accumulation             ·  1      
      ·      
   
  f is capital  (12) 
Technical change              ·  1      (13) 
Subscripts Exogenous  variables  
c  Commodities or economic sectors  b Foreign savings balance (foreign currency 
units) 
f  Factor groups (land, labour and capital)  r Foreign remittances 
h  Household groups  s Total factor supply 
t  Time periods  w World import and export prices 
Endogenous variables   Exogenous  parameters  
D  Household consumption demand quantity  α Shift parameter (factor productivity) 
E  Exchange (local/foreign currency units)  β Household average budget share 
F  Factor demand quantity  γ Hicks neutral rate of technical change 
I  Investment demand quantity  δ Factor input share parameter 
M  Import supply quantity  η Capital depreciation rate 
P  Commodity price  θ Household share of factor income 
Q  Output quantity  κ Base price per unit of capital stock 
W  Average factor return  ρ Investment commodity expenditure share 
X  Export demand quantity  υ Household marginal propensity to save 
Y  Total household income  φ Land and labour supply growth rate 
Source: Authors. 
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Foreign trade is determined by comparing domestic and world prices, where the latter are 
fixed under a small country assumption. The simple model implements trade as a 
complementarity problem. If domestic prices exceed world import prices w
m (adjusted by 
exchange rate E) then the quantity of imports M increases (eq. [3]). Conversely, if domestic 
prices fall below world export prices w
e then export demand X increases (eq. [4]). To ensure 
macroeconomic consistency, a flexible real exchange rate adjusts to maintain a fixed current 
account balance b (measured in foreign currency units) (eq. [8]). This means that falling 
world prices reduces exports and causes the real exchange rate to depreciate in order to 
enhance other export producers’ competitiveness and reduce overall import demand. 
Similarly, reducing FDI inflows (i.e., lowering b) causes the real exchange rate to depreciate. 
 
Factor incomes are distributed to households using fixed income shares θ based on 
households’ initial factor endowments and are combined foreign remittances r adjusted by the 
exchange rate (eq. [5]). Incomes Y are then saved (based on marginal propensities to save υ) 
or spent on consumption C (according to marginal budget shares β) (eq. [6]). Household 
savings and foreign capital inflows are collected in a national savings pool from which 
investment demand I is financed (i.e., a savings-driven investment closure) (eq. [7]). Finally, 
prices P equilibrate product markets such that demand for each commodity equals supply (eq. 
[8]). The model therefore links production and trade to household incomes via changes in 
market prices, employment and factor returns. 
 
The model’s variables and parameters are calibrated to empirical data from a social 
accounting matrix that captures the initial structure of Vietnam’s economy in 2007 (see Arndt 
et al. 2009). Parameters are then adjusted over time to reflect demographic and economic 
trends and the model is re-solved for a new equilibrium each half-year during 2007-11. 
Between periods the model is updated to reflect exogenous rates of land and labour expansion 
φ (eq. [11]). The rate of capital accumulation is determined endogenously, with previous 
period investment converted into new capital stocks using a fixed capital price κ (eq. [12]). 
This is added to previous capital stocks after applying a depreciation rate π. Finally, the 
model captures total factor productivity (TFP) through the production function’s shift 
parameter α, with the rate of technical change γ determined exogenously. 
4.2  Extensions to the full Vietnam model 
The above model illustrates how production, trade and household incomes are linked in our 
analysis. However, the full model drops some of the core model’s more restrictive 
assumptions (see Lofgren et al. 2002; Thurlow 2004). Constant elasticity of substitution 
production functions allow factor substitution based on relative factor prices (i.e., δ is no 
longer fixed). The model identifies 66 sectors (26 agriculture, 22 industry, and 10 services). 
Intermediate demand in each sector, which was excluded in the core model, is now 
determined by fixed technology coefficients (i.e., Leontief demand).  
 
Based on VHLSS 2006, labour markets are segmented across rural/urban areas and four 
education groups: (1) below primary schooling; (2) completed primary; (3) completed 
secondary; and (4) tertiary. Agriculture-specific factors include crop land, livestock, and 
fisheries stocks. All workers have upward-sloping supply curves implying a binding 
reservation wage.3 Agricultural factors are fully employed and earn flexible returns. Capital 
is immobile and new capital is allocated across sectors based on profit rate differentials under 
                                                 
3 Wage elasticities are set at 0.30 for lower-educated labour groups and 0.15 for higher-educated labour. This 
reflects greater underemployment in rural areas where education levels are lower.    11
a ‘putty-clay’ specification. This means that once capital is invested it cannot be used for 
other purposes. When annual profit rates on fixed capital fall by more than 20 per cent we 
assume that capital utilization declines. Unused capital continues to depreciate but is 
reactivated once profit rates improve. This specification of capital underutilization permits 
temporary rises in unemployment during the crises while retaining the producers’ capacity to 
expand production under better market conditions.  
 
International trade is captured by allowing production and consumption to shift imperfectly 
between domestic and foreign markets, depending on the relative prices of imports, exports 
and domestic goods (inclusive of indirect taxes). This differs from the core model, which 
assumed perfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods (i.e., homogenous 
products). This extension captures differences in domestic and foreign products and allows 
for observed two-way trade. Vietnam is still considered a small economy (i.e., world prices 
are fixed). Vietnam’s real exchange rate (i.e., price index of tradable-to-non-tradable goods) 
adjusts to maintain a constant current account balance. Production and trade elasticities are 
drawn from Dimaranan (2006).  
 
Households maximize a Stone-Geary utility function so that a linear expenditure system 
determines consumption with non-unitary income elasticities.4 Households are disaggregated 
across rural and urban areas and by per capita expenditure quintiles, giving a total of 10 
representative households in the DCGE model. Households pay taxes to the government 
based on fixed direct and indirect tax rates. Tax revenues finance exogenous recurrent 
spending, resulting in an endogenous fiscal deficit. Finally, the analysis includes a separate 
microsimulation module. In the module, each respondent in VHLSS is linked to their 
corresponding representative household group in the DCGE model. Changes in commodity 
prices and households’ consumption spending are passed down from the DCGE model to the 
microsimulation module. Total per capita consumption and poverty measures are then 
recalculated assuming Leontief preferences by individual households. 
5  Model simulations and results 
5.1  Baseline scenario  
The DCGE model is initially calibrated to track observed trends in key demographic and 
macroeconomic indicators. Annual labour force growth of about 2.5 per cent is targeted 
during 2007-11 (World Bank 2009a). Higher-educated labour grows faster than other labour 
types reflecting improvements in human capital stocks. For example, based on recent 
surveys, the supply of workers with tertiary schooling expands at 6.5 per cent per year, while 
the supply of workers with only primary schooling grows at 2.3 per cent (GSO 2009b). 
Technical change is also biased towards higher-educated labour, and is consistent with the 
negligible deviations in relative wages observed since 2000.  
 
Biased technical change favours skill-intensive sectors. Accordingly, total GDP growth of 
about 7.5 per cent per year in the baseline scenario is driven by industry and services, which 
grow at about 8.5 per cent during 2007-11. Agriculture grows at a slower 3 per cent per year. 
The national US$2-a-day poverty headcount rate declines from 47.3 per cent in 2007 to 42.2 
per cent by 2011. Although poverty declines in both rural and urban areas, slower agricultural 
                                                 
4 Income elasticities were estimated by Bingxin Yu (IFPRI) using the 2006 VHLSS.   12
growth results in slightly smaller reductions for rural households. A comparison with 
observed trends for 2005-07 suggests that this baseline adequately captures Vietnam’s growth 
path prior to the commodity and financial crises. The baseline scenario thus provides a 
reasonable counterfactual against which we can measure the impacts of the crises. 
5.2  Simulating the commodity and financial crises 
Section 3 identified impact channels linking the crises to economic growth. Here we describe 
the shocks imposed on the DCGE model. In the first simulation, we estimate the impact of 
the 2008 commodity crisis. Detailed world prices were taken from World Bank (2009b). The 
real price changes imposed on the model are shown in Table 5 for Vietnam’s main traded 
commodities. In the commodity crisis scenario, we only impose the price changes that took 
place during 2008 (i.e., the first two columns) so this is referred to as the ‘food/fuel’ 
simulation.  
Table 5: Shocks to the model  










World prices  Rice  30.0  10.0  -15.0  -5.0 
  (for selected products)  Coffee 7.0  0.0  -15.0  -3.0 
    Coal 30.0  10.0  -30.0  0.0 
  Oil and fuel  10.0  0.0  -20.0  -15.0 
 
Textiles and 
clothing  5.0  0.0 -10.0 7.0 
 Fertilizer  30.0  20.0  -30.0  -15.0 
 Machinery  5.0  -5.0  -10.0  0.0 
Foreign direct investment inflows  -  -  -15.0  -9.0 
Foreign transfers to households  -  -  -5.0  -5.0 
Stimulus package  Capital inflows  -  -  15.0  15.0 
 Recurrent  spending  -  -  3.0  3.0 
 Land  productivity  -  -  3.0  3.0 
 Social  transfers  -  -  8.0  8.0 
  Direct tax rates  -  -  -6.0  -6.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using world prices from World Bank (2009b). 
 
In assessing the 2009 financial crisis, we take the results from the ‘food/fuel’ simulation as 
our starting point (e.g., end 2008). We then incrementally include the changes in world 
prices, foreign investment and foreign remittances. In addition, rates of productivity growth 
are changed in order to track the GDP and trade changes described in Table 2. Changes in 
world prices during 2009 are shown in the final two columns of Table 5. These are imposed 
on the model in the ‘2009 prices’ simulation. In the ‘FDI outflows’ simulation we include 
both declining world prices and FDI flows. FDI falls by 15 per cent in the first and second 
halves of 2009, which is a cumulative decline of about 25 per cent for the year. Finally, in the 
‘remittances’ simulation we reduce foreign transfers to households by about 10 per cent 
based on projections from World Bank (2009c). Absolute declines in transfers are distributed 
proportionally across rural/urban households according to remittance receipts reported in   13
VHLSS. The ‘remittances’ scenario captures all three impact channels from Section 3 and 
thus reflects the overall impact of the 2009 financial crisis.  
 
Finally, we simulate the government’s stimulus package. First, interest support and advanced 
capital offset declining FDI by injecting foreign reserves into the private sector. These are 
modeled as a US$1.45 billion increase in external funds transferred to the real economy.5 
Secondly, we simulate a 3 per cent or US$300 million increase in recurrent government 
spending which raises agriculture’s productivity by 6 per cent.6 Third, we proportionally 
reduce direct tax rates on enterprises and households by about 12 per cent (not percentage 
points) and extend social transfers by US$10 per capita. The cost of these interventions is 
US$900 million and US$850 million respectively. Finally, the stimulus is assumed to 
eliminate about a quarter of the productivity growth losses incurred during the financial 
crisis. The overall stimulus package simulated in the DCGE model costs US$3.5 billion or 5 
per cent of GDP in 2008. The ‘stimulus’ simulation captures key elements of the proposed 
2009 stimulus package and is of similar magnitude.  
5.3  Impact of the 2008 food and fuel price crisis 
Table 6 presents the results for the food/fuel scenario, which captures the changes in 
commodity prices during 2008. Although price changes are modeled on a semester basis (i.e., 
half yearly), the table reports total impacts for 2008. As such, since the ban on additional rice 
exports was only imposed during the first half of 2008, the table reflects post-ban outcomes 
when world price changes had been transmitted to the domestic economy. As indicated 
earlier, Vietnam’s terms of trade improved in 2008, because weighted export prices rose by 
more than import prices. This was primarily due to rice and crude oil, which are major export 
commodities whose prices rose significantly (see Table 5). Recall that the export ban applied 
only to incremental exports of rice. Existing rice exports benefited from higher prices even 
when the ban was in place. In addition, the ban was not in place in the second half of 2008. 
The improvement in the terms of trade generates an appreciation of the real exchange rate, 
reflected in a reduced price of tradeable to non-tradeable commodities. The Vietnamese 
economy responds by reducing total exports, which fall by 1 per cent in volume terms below 
the baseline. Even though world import prices are rising, this is more than offset by the real 
appreciation and there is a slight increase in import volumes.   
 
The rapid onset of the 2008 commodity crisis constrained producers’ ability to respond to 
new external market conditions. This is captured in the model by fixing capital stock and land 
allocations and limiting labour substitution possibilities. There is still, however, a shift in 
resources towards commodities whose export profitability rises the most. Crop production, 
for example, expands by an additional 1.9 per cent as rice farmers eventually take advantage 
of higher export prices. This increases rural employment, mainly for lower-skilled farm 
workers. Conversely, manufacturing and services production falls, because the large real 
appreciation reduces their export competitiveness. Urban employment also declines as a 
result. Overall, the shift out of non-agriculture into lower productivity crop production causes 
                                                 
5 This is modeled as an increase in b in eq.[8] in Table 5. 
6 This implies a spending-to-productivity-growth elasticity of 0.05 since natural resource value-added is half of 
agricultural GDP and 5 percent of the state budget is allocated to agriculture (i.e., 0.03 / 0.05 / 0.5 x 0.05 = 
0.06). This elasticity is below the econometrically estimated returns to irrigation (0.11), rural roads (0.07) and 
agricultural research and extension (0.06) (Fan et al. 2004) but reflects possible delays in the returns to 
investments.    14
real GDP to decline slightly by 0.2 per cent. These results are consistent with the observed 
rise in agricultural GDP and decline in the growth of services GDP during 2008. 
Table 6: Model results for the 2008 food and fuel crisis 










Real GDP  100.0  7.0  -0.2 
Absorption (C+I+G)  113.3  7.3  1.1 
Consumption (C)   57.6  5.3  1.5 
Investment (I)  41.6  9.9  0.8 
Government (G)  14.1  8.2  0.0 
Exports (E)  76.5  7.3  -1.0 
Imports (M)  89.8  7.7  0.7 
Real exchange rate  100.0  1.5  -2.1 
Terms of trade  100.0  0.0  2.3 
   Exports  100.0  0.0  7.7 
   Imports  100.0  0.0  5.3 
Consumer price index  100.0  0.5  -1.4 
GDP at factor cost  100.0  7.0  -0.2 
Agriculture 22.1  3.5  0.5 
   Crops  13.4  3.4  1.9 
   Livestock  2.7  4.5  -0.2 
   Other  5.9  3.0  -2.2 
Industry 41.7  8.1  -0.2 
   Mining  10.9  6.2  0.5 
   Manufacturing  20.1  8.1  -1.0 
   Other  10.7  10.2  0.7 
Services 36.2  8.0  -0.6 
Employment (mil.)  39.1  2.7  0.9 
   Urban  11.2  4.0  -0.3 
   Rural  27.9  2.3  1.4 
National poverty (%)  47.3  -1.4  -3.6 
   Urban  15.2  -1.8  0.2 
   Rural  59.0  -1.2  -5.0 
Notes: The first column of numbers provides, from the top, baseline shares of GDP, initial price index levels, 
baseline shares of GDP at factor, employment in millions, and the poverty rate. The poverty rate is based on a 
US$2-per-day poverty line calculated using 2006 VHLSS (GSO 2007).  
Source: Results from the Vietnam DCGE and microsimulation model.  
 
Although economic growth declines slightly, there is still an increase in total absorption due 
to the terms of trade improvement. However, not all components of absorption are affected 
equally. Since recurrent government spending is constant in the model, tax revenues from oil 
exports are used to expand public investment. Overall, total investment demand rises by 0.8 
per cent relative to the baseline. The increase in investment also benefits from cheaper 
imported machinery and accounts for the expansion of construction (included in ‘other   15
industry’). Falling consumer prices, caused by cheaper imported goods and higher food 
production, also causes real private consumption to expand by 1.5 per cent. Since absorption 
is an aggregate measure of welfare in the economy, the results suggest that the global 
commodity crisis had a positive effect on welfare in Vietnam. 
 
The net employment-effects of the 2008 commodity crisis were also positive. At the national-
level, employment increased by 0.9 per cent or about 350,000 jobs. Most of these new jobs 
are created in the agricultural sector, which explains why the rural poverty headcount 
declines by five percentage points.7 Overall, the commodity crisis reduced the number of 
people in Vietnam living below the US$2-a-day poverty line by 3.1 million people. As shown 
in Figure 4, the poverty reduction only occurs after the lifting of the rice export ban. This is 
because the ban limited the increase in producer prices and hence many of the gains for rural 
farmers. Lifting of the ban during the second half of 2008 allowed domestic prices to adjust 
to higher world prices and for rural farmers to increase rice production, causing poverty to 
decline. Overall, this is a substantial decline in national poverty beyond what would have 
been expected without the positive terms of trade effects caused by the global commodity 
crisis.     
Figure 4: National poverty headcount, 2007-10 
 
Note: Poverty rate is the US$2-a-day poverty line calculated using 2006 VHLSS (GSO 2007).  
Source: Results from the Vietnam DCGE and microsimulation model.  
 
5.4  The 2009 financial crisis and global recession 
Table 7 shows how the impact of the financial crisis is decomposed into falling world prices, 
FDI and remittances. Productivity growth is also reduced in order to track GDP and trade 
impacts. As indicated, simulations of the financial crisis are cumulative such that the 
remittances column reflects the full impact of the crisis in 2009 without any mitigating 
government stimulus and the final column indicates the effect assuming that the proposed 
                                                 





















































stimulus package is fully enacted. The first two columns of results, labeled food/fuel 
scenario, show annual growth rates for 2009 assuming the high world prices prevailing in 
2008 had continued into 2009. The remaining columns present contemporaneous percentage 
point differences from this food/fuel crisis scenario. 
Table 7: Model results for the 2009 financial crisis 
















2009 (%)    Deviation from food/fuel scenario, 2009 (% point) 
Real GDP  100.0  7.2  0.5  -3.4  -3.7  -2.3 
Absorption (C+I+G)  115.0  7.6  1.5  -4.1  -5.3  -2.2 
Consumption (C)   57.6  5.2  0.9  -2.7  -4.3  -1.8 
Investment (I)  43.1  10.6  2.9  -7.5  -8.4  -4.7 
Government  (G)  14.3 8.2  0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 
Exports (E)  76.2  7.7  -0.6 -4.5 -4.1 -4.4 
Imports (M)  91.1  8.1  0.9  -5.3  -6.0  -3.9 
Real exchange rate  100.0  1.8  -1.4 -1.2 -0.6 -2.0 
Terms of trade  100.0  0.0  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5 
   Exports  100.0  0.0  -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 -6.8 
   Imports  100.0  0.0  -7.3 -7.3 -7.3 -7.3 
Consumer price index  100.0 0.9  0.5 0.9 1.0 0.5 
GDP at factor cost  100.0  7.3  0.4  -3.4  -3.6  -2.2 
Agriculture  21.5  3.2  -0.1 -1.6 -1.8 0.3 
   Crops  13.2  3.3  -0.6  -1.8  -1.9  0.6 
   Livestock  2.7  4.6  0.5 -1.8 -2.6 -0.6 
   Other  5.6  2.3  0.6  -1.3  -1.3  0.1 
Industry 42.1  8.4  0.4  -4.6  -4.9  -3.9 
   Mining  10.9  6.2  -0.8 -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 
   Manufacturing  20.1  8.4  0.0  -5.2  -5.4  -4.9 
   Other  11.1  10.6  2.2  -7.2  -8.0  -4.8 
Services 36.4  8.3  0.7  -2.9  -3.2  -1.8 
Employment (mil.)  40.5  2.7  -0.1 -1.0 -1.1 -0.3 
   Urban  11.6  3.9  0.6  -0.2  -0.3  0.2 
   Rural  28.9  2.2  -0.3 -1.3 -1.4 -0.6 
National poverty (%)  42.3  -1.3  1.0  3.0  3.3  2.3 
   Urban  13.6  -0.7  -0.6  0.5  0.5  0.0 
   Rural  52.7  -1.5  1.6  3.9  4.3  3.2 
Notes: The first column of numbers is similar to the first column of Table 6 but is based on simulation results from 
the food and fuel crisis scenario in 2008. From the top, the column contains shares of GDP, reinitialized price 
index levels, shares of GDP at factor, employment in millions, and the poverty rate. The poverty rate is based on 
a US$2-per-day poverty line calculated using 2006 VHLSS (GSO 2007).  
Source: Results from the Vietnam DCGE and microsimulation model.  
 
We first focus on changes in world prices (see the third column of Table 7). Falling world 
prices in 2009 improved Vietnam’s terms of trade even beyond the levels achieved in 2008. 
Based on 2007 trade shares, trade-weighted import prices fell faster than export prices. Note 
that import prices receive a larger weight in the terms of trade calculation due to Vietnam’s 
trade deficit. The decline in the import price index is driven principally by falling prices for 
imported intermediates, such as metals, fuels, and textiles. The falling prices for imported 
investment goods, such as machinery and transport equipment, also reduces the import price 
index. Relative to the world prices prevailing under the food and fuel crisis, prices under the 
financial crisis improve terms of trade by 0.5 per cent. This causes the real exchange rate to 
appreciate by a further -1.4 per cent. Together, lower prices for major exports and the real 
appreciation cause real exports to fall by 0.6 per cent relative to the level registered in the 
food/fuel scenario in 2009. The real appreciation also favours imports, whose volume   17
expands by 0.9 per cent. Changes in sector production are opposite to those experienced 
during the 2008 commodity crisis. Crop production falls alongside world rice prices. Urban 
employment increases while rural employment declines. In terms of the components of 
absorption, the high import intensity of investment permits real investment to rise due to 
lower world prices for imported investment goods combined with the real appreciation. 
Consumers also benefit from the improved terms of trade in the aggregate; but declining 
agricultural GDP reduces farm incomes for poorer rural households, with poverty rising as a 
result. 
 
The impact of the financial crisis is both negative and more pronounced in the FDI and 
Remittances scenarios (see columns labeled (4) and (5) in Table 7). As expected, falling FDI 
causes a substantial contraction in total investment. The reduced demand for imported capital 
goods helps maintain external balance without a large depreciation of the real exchange rate. 
At the same time, reduced FDI implies a reduction in the growth rate of the capital stock. 
Since the model is run on a semester basis, the reduction in FDI in the first half of 2009 leads 
to reduced capital in the second half of 2009. Overall, by end 2009, real GDP declines due to 
reduced capital availability, lower levels of labour employment, and declines in factor-
specific productivity growth of 0.5 and 1.5 percentage points for rural and urban factors 
respectively. This decline in economic activity causes household incomes and real 
consumption spending to fall. The results for the Remittances scenario indicate that half of 
the overall decline in consumption spending during the financial crisis was due to falling 
remittances, which directly affects households’ incomes. Declining remittance inflows also 
reduces the real appreciation. 
 
The largest reduction in economic growth following the crisis was in manufacturing and 
other industry. This is consistent with the declines in prices, demand, and foreign direct 
investment actually observed. The largest declines in production were for textiles and 
clothing. Machinery and construction (i.e., ‘other industry’) also contracted sharply because 
of lower investment demand, which uses these commodities intensively. FDI accounts for 
about a tenth and a third of total investment in agriculture and agro-processing respectively, 
and so these sectors contracted in the FDI outflows scenario. Declining world prices and 
weaker consumer demand also contributed to the decline of agriculture during the financial 
crisis. These results are consistent with the observed declines in sector GDP in 2009.  
 
The financial crisis caused employment to fall by 1.1 per cent relative to the employment 
levels obtained in following the food and fuel crisis. More than 90 per cent of the 430,000 job 
losses were in rural areas, which is where most of the workforce is employed. However, 
urban employment also fell. The share of the population below the US$2-a-day poverty line 
increased by 3.3 percentage points relative to the level attained in the food/fuel scenario in 
2009. This is equivalent to an additional three million people living below the poverty as a 
result of the financial crisis. Furthermore, even though agriculture experienced the smallest 
relative contraction in output, rural poverty increases by more than in urban areas due to the 
declines, including job losses, in labour-intensive crop production. The bunching of rural 
households at consumption levels near the poverty line also implies a greater sensitivity of 
the poverty rate to consumption changes in rural versus urban areas.  
5.5  The 2009 government stimulus package 
Four components of the stimulus package are simulated, namely interest rate support to the 
private sector; public investments in agriculture; direct tax relief; and social transfers to   18
households.8 We assume that the government draws on foreign reserves in order to inject 
funds into the private sector. This lowers the decline in investment demand relative to the 
remittances scenario (see the final column in Table 7). Tax relief and social transfers also 
increase consumption spending, although it is insufficient to fully compensate for the decline 
in household incomes caused by the financial crisis. The increase in recurrent government 
spending reflects additional expenditure on agriculture. Together the increase in investment, 
consumption and recurrent spending offsets some of the decline in absorption caused by the 
financial crisis. The use of foreign exchange reserves drives a real appreciation in the 
currency relative to the remittances scenario thus encouraging imports and further reducing 
exports.    
 
Agricultural GDP growth accelerates under the simulated stimulus package. This reduces the 
decline in rural employment. Increased investment generates immediate demand for 
construction (i.e., ‘other industry’), which now declines at a slower rate. The overall decline 
industrial GDP caused by the financial crisis is also lessened by the stimulus package due to 
higher productivity levels, and despite the lag between providing interest rate support and the 
eventual translation of higher investment into new capital stocks. However, manufacturing 
relies on external demand, which is unaffected by the stimulus package. Thus, manufacturing 
growth remains largely unchanged. Rather, it is in the service sectors that the stimulus 
package generates additional urban employment. Lowering taxes and providing social 
transfers increases households’ demand for consumer goods. Non-traded services, unlike 
industry, are less affected by import competition caused by the real appreciation. These 
results suggest that some of the resurgence in agriculture, construction and services during 
late 2009 can be attributed to the stimulus package.  
 
Ultimately, the stimulus package prevents around two-fifths of the decline in total GDP 
caused by the financial crisis. The stimulus has a larger impacts on employment and causes a 
significant reduction in poverty. This is evident in Figure 4, which shows how the stimulus 
package lowers the increase in poverty caused by the financial crisis by about one third. This 
means that about 860,000 people are kept above the US$2-a-day poverty line as a result of 
the simulated stimulus package. While this is still above the poverty levels that would have 
been achieved without the financial crisis, it is well below the baseline scenario which 
excludes the gains from the 2008 commodity crisis. However, the gap between between the 
food/fuel and stimulus scenarios in Figure 4 suggests that the increase poverty caused by the 
financial crisis will persist well into the future. 
6 Conclusion   
From a macroeconomic perspective, Vietnam has weathered the recent global crises 
relatively well. However, there is little rigorous analysis of why the effects were relatively 
small and not much quantitative evidence is available on how workers and households were 
affected, especially those at the lower end of the income distribution. In this paper, a dynamic 
economy-wide model was developed to decompose the effects of the crises and to translate 
the macro-level impacts of the crises into household incomes and poverty.  
 
                                                 
8 Note that our analysis does not consider the long-term implications of expanding the fiscal deficit and long-
term debt position.    19
Model results indicate that the 2008 commodity crisis improved Vietnam’s terms of trade. It 
raised aggregate welfare and reduced poverty, mainly by expanding exports in labour-
intensive sectors. The 2009 financial crisis reversed the welfare gains from 2008. Even 
though world price shifts in 2009 improved Vietnamese terms of trade beyond the gains 
observed in 2008, reductions in demand for exports, FDI, and remittances caused a 
contraction in economic activity. The financial crisis pushed three million people below the 
US$2-a-day poverty line relative to the food/fuel scenario. The vast majority of the 
population that fell into poverty resided in rural areas. Agriculture and the rural non-farm 
economy were limited in their ability to cushion the effects of the financial crisis. Vietnam’s 
agricultural sector has a strong export-orientation, which makes it vulnerable to world market 
conditions.  
 
The simulated impact of the government’s stimulus package shows that it has the potential to 
offset some of the welfare losses caused by the financial crisis and substantially reduce the 
impact on poor households. Overall, the combined net effect of the two crises had little effect 
on poverty (and other principal macroeconomic indicators) compared with the baseline (no 
crises) path even assuming the stimulus policies designed to counter the financial crisis had 
no effect on current welfare. Under the assumption of an effective stimulus package, poverty 
rates are actually lower than the baseline (no crises) path. 
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